Mrs. R. We hope he means no one will be the sacrificial lamb and this is how we feel, that we were sacrificed at the altar of this thing.

Senator BYRD. Will you be able to restore your property?

Mr. R. Not profitably. Even if I restore it, it will never have the same value that it once had. And then on top of that, it will be unlikely to rent it to a white owner because no one wants to go in that area. If we are fortunate to rent it, it will have to be to a Negro tenant.

Mrs. R. And if you want to know, that is playing right into their hands. That is precisely what they want. I think this is the idea. You see, if they burn you and then don't let you back in, this is entree to them. What are you going to do with a burned out hole? You either are going to have to try to rebuild it, and if you do, then you have to sell it or give it or sacrifice it, and this is the way I see it. This is the plan behind the whole thing. That is why certain things were pinpointed, and I will say before it was burned, we had an idea of trying to get a Small Business loan for the fellow that we had managing the store. Maybe we could put him in.

Senator BYRD. I want to thank you for your time.

(Thereupon, at 10:30 p.m., the hearing was concluded.)

OUTSTANDING DISABLED VETERAN OF IOWA

Mr. HICKENLOOPER. Mr. President, I have a letter from Mr. Donald D. Mayers, commander of the Scott County Chapter No. 2 of the Disabled American Veterans, of Davenport, Iowa, in which he refers to the selection of Past Commander George T. Nickolas, of Davenport, Iowa, as the outstanding disabled veteran of Iowa, selected at the State convention in Waterloo, Iowa, on June 22, 1968.

He encloses a copy of an editorial by Past Commander Nickolas on the forthcoming "Hire the Physically Handicapped" Week. I think it is worthy of note, and I ask unanimous consent that Commander Mayers' letter be published and be followed by the editorial by George T. Nickolas, entitled "It Is Easy To Do Less."

There being no objection, the letter and editorial were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

DIABLED AMERICAN VETERANS, SCOTT COUNTY CHAPTER No. 2,
Davenport, Iowa, September 20, 1968.

Hon. B. B. HICKENLOOPER,
U.S. Senate Office Building
Washington, D.C.

MY DEAR SENATOR HICKENLOOPER: We of Scott County Chapter Two have been honored by having Past Department Commander George T. Nickolas of 4426 El Rancho Drive, Davenport, Iowa, honored as the Outstanding Disabled Veteran of Iowa. The State Convention in Waterloo, Iowa, on 22 June 1968 selected him for this singular honor. Past Commander Nickolas was also honored by the Freedoms Foundation at Valley Forge with a George Washington Honor Medal for a letter to the editor that he wrote as Department Commander of Iowa.

I have taken the liberty of enclosing an editorial that Post Commander Nickolas wrote for the forthcoming "Hire the Physically Handicapped Week". I think that it conveys a message that would be well for all of us to read. I hope that you will take the time to have it read into the Congressional Record. If you do place it in the Record, I would appreciate two copies of the Record. We would like to have one placed in our Department Historical Records and we will present the other to Past Commander Nickolas.

I would also like to take this opportunity to express our appreciation of your years of distinguished service to Iowa. We of the Disabled American Veterans of Iowa will miss your able representation in Congress.

Very truly yours,
DONALD D. MAYERS,
Commander.

IT IS EASY TO DO LESS

(By George T. Nickolas)

The disabled veterans who are victims of America's wars quite likely appear to be well cared for and adequately compensated for their loss. It is easy for us to agree and sympathize with programs for the disabled; it is easy and convenient to set up local, state, and national committees to promote hiring the physically handicapped, and it is easy to set aside a national week to bring to everyone's attention the "Hire the Physically Handicapped Program," but this process lulls our citizens into thinking that everything possible is being done, and that the disabled veterans are living the "good life" and obtaining good jobs.

We have in the past few years seen vast changes in the providing of equal job opportunities to minority groups and women. In some cases special treatment is granted to compensate for past inequities. We have seen organized labor obtain for the working class better working conditions, decent wages, adequate vacation time, rest breaks, and necessary fringe benefits.

The "American Way" has fostered the free enterprise system and, in turn, the collective bargaining system. These have contributed toward making this country great. Valiant young men have supported and defended this "American Way," and have given their arms, their legs, their sight, and their health. It behooves us to do more than pay lip service to the program of "Hire the Physically Handicapped." How can we turn our backs on the men who gave so much in order that we may continue to enjoy the fruits of the most advanced labor conditions, industrial climate, and individual freedoms of any nation in history? It is not easy to say, but the truth of the matter is we do *forget* these men. Industry will not hire many of these handicapped veterans because it increases their insurance costs and thus their overhead to produce products. What disabled veterans seeking a job has not heard this over-used excuse?

The labor and business men of this great country simply *must* join together with the various veterans organizations in the fight to provide equal job opportunities, living wages, and good working conditions for these deserving disabled men who have given so much. Today, much more than ever before, the business and labor communities must join in the re-education, counseling and placement of disabled American veterans. Every day that the Vietnam War continues, scores of Americans are wounded and disabled in the service of their country. These veterans must be rehabilitated and become a vital element of the American Labor market. Let the man stand and be counted who states that the disabled veterans ask for special privileges, charity or welfare. No, my friends, they ask only, and surely deserve, a chance to honorably earn a living for themselves and their families.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The clerk will call the roll.

The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Mr. PELL. Mr. President, on July 9, 3 months ago almost to the day, I returned from a visit to Czechoslovakia. I first visited Czechoslovakia over 30 years ago and have visited there frequently ever since. In fact, I served there for 2 years on my first assignment as a Foreign Service officer—a period that included time before, during, and after the Communist putsch of 1948 and have been back there several times since.

When I left Czechoslovakia in July, I was both exhilarated and apprehensive. I was exhilarated by the brave efforts of Czechoslovakia's new leaders to reform its Communist society to make it more democratic and humanistic, more responsive to the will of the Czech and Slovak peoples, more tolerant of dissent and more progressive socially, economically and culturally. I was, at the same time, apprehensive because of ominous signs which pointed to the almost certain prospect of Soviet economic, political, and military pressures and which led me to warn—in my report in July to the Committee on Foreign Relations—of the very real possibility of a repetition of the Soviet invasion of Hungary in 1956. My fears unfortunately proved to be well founded, and the world has seen the tragedy all of us hoped we would not see.

The Soviet Union has paid a stiff price for its invasion and occupation of Czechoslovakia. When Soviet, and other Warsaw Pact, armies violated the frontiers of Czechoslovakia they ruptured the already tenuous unity of the Communist world. The Communist Parties of France and Italy, the two largest Communist Parties in Western Europe, declared themselves opposed to the invasion of Czechoslovakia, even though they had supported the Soviet invasion of Hungary in 1956, as did the Rumanian and Yugoslav parties. Elsewhere in Eastern Europe, the Soviets have lost considerable popular support. And in Czechoslovakia itself, the traditional friendship for the Soviet Union has been replaced by a deep enmity. Even within the Soviet Union, there are signs that the invasion has widened the gap between the leaders and the people and has further alienated important elements in Soviet society.

Their aggression has also cost the Soviets seriously outside the Communist world. The growing détente between Communist and non-Communist Europe has been set back.

In the United States, there has been a sharp hardening in the attitude of the public toward the Soviet Union, an attitude which had shown some disposition to replace emotional anticommunism with a more pragmatic willingness to take Soviet expressions of a desire for peaceful coexistence at face value. The

Senate's delay in advising and consenting to ratification of the Nonproliferation Treaty is tangible evidence of this new mood. In brief, the icy winds of the cold war have again begun to blow across Europe and the Atlantic.

We do not yet know how the Czechoslovak tragedy will unfold in the coming months. It is too early to tell, for example, whether Czechoslovakia's new leaders will be able to remain in office or to retain even a trace of the reforms they had instituted. The language of the Soviet-Czech communique of October 4, in which the Czechoslovak delegation promised that they "will intensify the struggle against the anti-Socialist forces, will take the necessary measures to place all the mass information media at the service of socialism, will reinforce the party and state organs with men firmly adhering to positions of Marxism, Leninism, and proletarian internationalism" does not bode well for the future of the Czech and Slovak people. Nor do we know for how long the example of Czechoslovakia's fate will paralyze reform movements in other Eastern European countries, although the behavior of the Soviet Union may well accelerate, rather than suppress, the latent discontent. "The invasion is bound to lead to new malcontent and disillusionment," one authority on communism observed in a recent interview. The authority whose words I quote is none other than Milovan Djilas, former Vice President of Yugoslavia.

The invasion and occupation of Czechoslovakia pose delicate questions for our policy toward Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. For the Soviets have upset a fundamental assumption of Western policy—the assumption that the Soviets would not resort to the use of force in Europe as they had in Hungary; the assumption, in other words, that 1968 was not 1956.

In fact, 1968 has proved to be 1956 with a vengeance. For not only Soviet soldiers violated the frontiers of a fraternal ally; Polish, Hungarian, Bulgarian, and even East German forces were also involved. These members of the Warsaw Pact thus violated their own solemn commitments to each other, for article 8 of the Warsaw Treaty states that the contracting parties adhere "to the principle of respect for the independence and sovereignty of the others and noninterference in their internal affairs." And, unlike the situation in Hungary in 1956 when Soviet intervention was aimed at preserving a socialist regime which seemed in danger of being replaced by a non-Socialist regime, and at holding a country in the Warsaw Pact which threatened to sever its alliance ties, Soviet and Warsaw Pact soldiers now occupy a country whose government was headed by Communists who had pledged to keep it Communist and who had also pledged to remain faithful to the Warsaw Pact.

Ideas cannot be defeated by tanks and bayonets are of little use against ideology. Military force cannot hold back the powerful impulses of nationalism. Nor can rhetoric. In a speech before the United Nations General Assembly on October 3, Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko said that ". . . socialism really and genuinely does settle the national question." His statement may express his dream, but it certainly does not describe a reality.

We are learning the power of ideology and the force of nationalism in a most painful way in Vietnam today. The Soviet Union will learn the same lesson—both at home and throughout its empire in Eastern Europe—as a result of the invasion of Czechoslovakia, an invasion which can perhaps best be described as a rearguard engagement in a losing battle against reaction. For reform is the wave of the future in every country, including the Communist countries of Europe. Communism will have to accommodate to change or it will destroy itself by being torn apart from within. The human spirit craves independence and freedom, not censorship and restriction. The Czechoslovaks demonstrated this fact clearly in the months prior to August 21. They, and others, will demonstrate it again in the years ahead.

Writing from Prague in October 1938, a month after the Munich agreement, George F. Kennan observed:

> The story of Czechoslovakia is not yet ended. There is no use in minimizing the dangers and trials that lie ahead. But if there is any lesson to be learned from the tortuous history of this continent, it is that strength, courage, and perseverance—qualities which the Czech people now possess in greater degree than ever before—have never been permanently suppressed and have never failed in the end to win their just place in the surging, changing movement of political life.
>
> This thought will not comfort the Czechs in their present mood of bitterness and frustration; but it may well be a source of consolation to those outsiders who have followed their past struggles with sympathy and admiration and who have never ceased to wish them well for the future.

Strength, courage, and perseverance have still not been permanently suppressed. And the people of Czechoslovakia should know that those of us who have followed their past struggles, including their most recent struggles, "with sympathy and admiration" continue to wish them well for the future. For in 1968, as in 1938, their future and our future are inextricably linked.

In connection with these thoughts and the eventual outcome of events in Czechoslovakia, I recently read a very interesting article entitled "The Kremlin's Great Mistake," written by Victor Zorza and published in Look magazine on October 1, 1968.

Mr. Zorza has well expressed many thoughts that I share. I ask unanimous consent that Mr. Zorza's article be printed in the RECORD following my remarks.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

THE KREMLIN'S GREAT MISTAKE: RUSSIA'S GANG-UP ON CZECHOSLOVAKIA THREATENS TO BACKFIRE AND SPEED UP EXACTLY THE COMMUNIST REFORMS THE SOVIETS DREAD

(By Victor Zorza)

The seizure of Czechoslovakia, which the Kremlin though would stop the breakup of the Communist world, is bound to hurry it. The slow process of change that was turning Stalinist Russia into a politically civilized country looked, until recently, as if it would take another generation or so. Now, the Czechoslovak lesson to the Kremlin leaders is that there is not enough time for the slow and orderly phasing of change. The Russians know now that tragedy will result unless the system is reformed from within, quickly. If they have learned this lesson, it will take no longer than five or ten years to adapt an obsolete political structure to the needs of the modern world. If they have failed to learn anything, the system will fall to pieces before that, as it was beginning to in Czechoslovakia.

Two powerful elements are accelerating the march of Communist politics—the people, who in the past were largely an object to be manipulated and progressive politicians, who in the past rarely dared to reveal themselves as such. Both these elements have always existed in Communist countries, but Czechoslovakia has shown their potential power. For six months, until Russian tanks drove into Prague, a free people were seeking ways to make their new freedom last. They were using Communist politicians as the instruments of their search, and the Communists, except for a small minority of discredited officials, were at one with the nation.

Potentially, the same relationship of forces exists within every Communist country. The people of Poland or Hungary, or for that matter, Russia, want exactly the same kind of freedom that the Czechs and Slovaks have been demanding, and the politicians in the Kremlin know it. These politicians are themselves divided into those who would give the people at least some of the freedoms they crave, as the Dubcek leadership was trying to do both before and after the invasion, and the unregenerate Stalinists or neo-Stalinists, who believe that the people must be held in subjection and that their craving for freedom can and must be suppressed. It may be difficult to imagine Communist politicians being in favor of granting political freedoms to the nation, but Czechoslovakia has proved once again that it can happen.

We in the West must make at least the effort of imagination to try to see that this same political division exists within every Communist country, instead of regarding the party leaders as united in their opposition to freedom and in their hostility to the outside world. We should not expect them to share our views. Their own will do just as well. The progressive wing in the Czechoslovak Communist leadership was not implanted by the West; it did not derive its ideas from the Bible, but from Karl Marx. Dubcek himself was trained in Russia, in the school for Communist leaders from which many of the Soviet Union's own top officials must graduate. As Dubcek and his comrades struggled and intrigued and pushed to get President Novotny out, so younger men, more radically inclined than the established leadership, are struggling and intriguing and pushing to get Brezhnev out of the Kremlin; and in this, they have the sympathy, and probably the help, of older men such as Kosygin, who are more in tune with the feelings of the pepole.

The alliance between the people and some of their politicians is what brought Czechoslovakia to a boil. Similar alliances, instinctively felt, will keep other Communist countries simmering dangerously, unless the Kremlin manages to devise some means of reducing the heat. The invasion of Czechoslovakia cannot and will not by itself take the heat out of Communist politics. It can do no more than clamp a lid on the cauldron for a short while, but under that lid, the emotions and the hopes, the passions and the ideals, will reverberate and spread and grow until the whole thing explodes; unless,

of course, the Communist leaders themselves realize the extent of the danger and do something about it. It is generally agreed that Soviet troops marched into Czechoslovakia because the Russians feared that the striving for freedom would spread to the other Communist countries and thus cause the distintegration of the whole totalitarian structure. The conclusion usually drawn from this is that the Kremlin will henceforth suppress, ruthlessly and irrevocably, the progressive trend in Russia and in the other Communist countries. But given the nature of Communist politics as it has developed over the last few years, this conclusion is based on the wrong premises.

Ever since Khrushchev took the reins of power, the Kremlin has been conducting a holding operation, to prevent too rapid a change in the structure of the Communist system, rather than to prevent change altogether. Virtually everything that the Communist leaders have done, in Russia and elsewhere, can be seen in terms of this holding operation, designed to gain time to control and direct the process of change, instead of allowing it to sweep them out of power. But they know that change is inevitable, and that if they try to stop it, it will come about without them.

In Russia, the evolution of the Communist political system has been going forward with the leaders' grudging cooperation, ever since they got rid of Khrushchev for forcing the pace of change too abruptly. What their intervention in Czechoslovakia shows is that they realize how vulnerable their own country is to the freedom infection; after all, that is why they thought they had to move. They know that Russia and the other Communist countries are as ready as Czechoslovakia was for the new political system that must take the place of the existing political patchwork of lies, coercion and compromise. They know that they cannot indefinitely keep sending their tanks into neighboring countries, or, for that matter, into Russian cities, to keep the old system from crumbling. They, therefore, marched into Czechoslovakia in order to give themselves a breathing space. But the need to march—and the tremendous political cost that they incurred thereby—will have gone a long way to persuading them that they themselves must now speed up the process of change.

The Kremlin's action reflected a deeply held belief, and fear, among the leaders of the Soviet Union and their allies that Czechoslovakia was going "capitalist." There is a chance that the degree of freedom Czechoslovakia's new leaders were prepared to allow would have ultimately made it possible for the nation, in free elections, to sweep the Communists out of power. If this had happened, Czechoslovakia would, for all practical purposes, have left the Communist camp. Even without any such drastic political change, the unhindered reform of Czechoslovakia would have made it seem more and more "capitalistic" in the eyes of the Communist governments, so that they would have come to regard it as part of the Western bloc—as, for a time, they regarded Tito's Yugoslavia.

If the Russians had allowed the Czechoslovak reformation to proceed, the pattern would have been much the same. They would again have taken every step to isolate it from the main body of communism, and to insulate themselves from the creative current of ideas flowing through the Czechoslovak Communist party. But this could have succeeded only if they had pushed Czechoslovakia into the arms of the West, thus providing themselves with an excuse for treating the country as a Communist renegade and enemy, as they had treated Yugoslavia.

A new Iron Curtain separating Czechoslovakia from the rest of the Communist world would not have been completely effective, but it might well have been sufficiently thick to muffle the sound of any successes attained by the Czechoslovak experiment. Simple ideas like freedom of speech and of the press cannot be kept out of Russia these days. Actually, there is little need to import them. They exist wherever men are capable of thought and feeling. What makes them dangerous is any evidence, such as Czechoslovakia would have provided, that freedom works, and pays.

The Russian leaders thus had only two alternatives: to isolate Czechoslovakia, which might have enabled them to delay considerably the spread of the freedom infection, or, by invading the country, to suppress the infection.

In choosing the second course, they tried to do the impossible; for whatever initial successes the Kremlin might achieve, the Czechoslovak experiment will go on. It may go on more slowly, but after initial setbacks, it is bound to be resumed with redoubled force. Moreover, so long as Czechoslovakia remains part of the Communist bloc, its experiments are part of the evolutionary process within the bloc as a whole, and they are certain to have a greater effect on what is happening in Moscow—and in the other Communist capitals—than if Czechoslovakia had left the Communist camp. By sending troops to keep it inside the Communist camp, the Kremlin has ensured that the Czechoslovak experiment will stay within the family—and that the family will be inevitably affected by it.

But where is the assurance that the Czechoslovak reforms will continue? After all, the Polish reform movement of 1956 soon spent itself; and the Hungarians, once they recovered from the 1956 revolution, were content to accept the gradual but exceedingly slow improvements that the Russians have since allowed them to introduce, as long as they do not tinker with the system.

The Polish and Hungarian revolutions were the outbursts of pent-up emotion as the long Stalinist night began to give way to the new dawn. They were unprepared, unpremeditated reactions to the sudden loosening of control. After the passions had played themselves out, the Kremlin pulled in the reins again, and the Communist leaders of Poland and Hungary cooperated. They feared that failure to do so would lead to the overthrow of their own Communist parties and loss of their jobs.

The Czechoslovak revolution, by contrast, was led by the party's own more forward-looking leaders, who for several years had worked in the secrecy of the party apparatus to move toward a more progressive policy. When they finally became convinced that President Novotny and his immediate entourage were determined to prevent any such change, they acted. But now the years of intrigue and secret party struggle gave way to a clear-cut issue; and for the first time in the history of Communist rule, an established party leadership was removed from power by something like a democratic voting procedure within the party organization. The nation cheered, and gave a genuine mandate to the new leaders to carry out the new policies, economic and cultural, to provide both bread and freedom.

Intellectual ferment, in which the writers had played a major part, was an important element of the Czechoslovak revolution, as it had been in Poland's and in Hungary's. But the economic issue, which had intruded repeatedly into the party discussions since 1963, was new in the case of Czechoslovakia—and decisive. The old economic system, taken over from the Russians together with one-party rule, worked after a fashion for a few years, when Czechoslovakia was building steelworks and tractor plants. But it proved hopelessly inadequate to the needs of a country that saw its capitalist neighbors grow richer and richer, develop new industries, install modern management techniques, introduce sophisticated technologies, while Czechoslovakia lagged behind, tied to the Russian economy, which itself trailed perceptibly behind Western Europe and, disastrously, behind America. It was this economic disequilibrium that the more progressive Czechoslovak Communists set out to correct. But in so doing, they found that they had to change the political system as well. The economic ills were rooted in the decision-making process, which was devised to suppress political independence, and at the same time suppressed the business initiative that alone could have delivered the goods.

The essence of Karl Marx's analysis of 19th-century Europe was that The Revolution would come when the people realized that the economic structure of society was hampering its development. There was much in his analysis that was sound common sense. Perversely, it is now in Communist Russia and its satellites that the economic structure is hampering the development of society. The Czechoslovak Communist party, the first to perceive this, launched its own revolution against the orthodox political establishment, just as Marx predicted would happen.

Whatever the immediate political consequence of the invasion of Czechoslovakia may be, the economic revolution will go on. In time, the economic structure of the system will change so much that it will affect the political structure. The essence of the economic changes being demanded by reformers all over the Communist world—and there are many of them even in the highest reaches of the Soviet party—is that economic decisions should be taken on rational economic grounds, to yield the greatest good for the community and to prevent the senseless waste of huge resources that has been so marked a feature of the Communist economic system.

This is the one great issue between the conservatives and the radicals in the Communist leaderships everywhere. Kosygin has had to fight repeatedly in the Kremlin to get his economic-reform schemes passed; but often, the execution of these plans lagged far behind the vision of the more radical innovators. The opposition can usually be traced to the vested interests of the party bureaucracy, which does not want the power of economic decision-making to be taken out of its hands. It knows that once this happens, political power, too, will soon slip out of its grasp. The essence of political power is to decide on the allocation of the nation's resources between competing demands, and the party establishment wants to do this in the secrecy of the Kremlin council chamber, not in full view of the people, who might then be inclined to demand a voice in the proceedings.

In recent years, the leadership debate about the allocation of resources has become so bitter that it could scarcely be hidden from the nation. Khrushchev's failure to satisfy the demands of the military for more and better weapons was one of the main causes of his downfall. The conservatives in the political leadership, who had many complaints of their own against Khrushchev's radical policies, were able to count on the military in securing his removal from power. But Brezhnev and Kosygin, who worked together to get rid of Khrushchev, soon fell out themselves on the same military vs. civilian issue. Brezhnev, beholden to the military, wanted to give them more money. Kosygin, concerned about the health of the economy, wanted the money for modernization and development.

Brezhnev was the product of the party machine, and the hints discernible between the lines of his public speeches reveal something of the conservative stand that he was taking on behalf of the bureaucracy in the secret Kremlin debates. Kosygin's job was to run the country's industry, and *his* speeches reveal a preoccupation with practical affairs,

an interest in securing results through the rational management of the economy and a barely suppressed impatience with empty ideological catchwords.

Whenever there is any hint of differences in the leadership, Brezhnev and Kosygin can usually be seen on opposite sides of the fence. It is Brezhnev who has been making speeches denouncing Soviet writers and intellectuals for demanding, in effect, the same freedom that the Czechoslovak writers had won for themselves. Kosygin is known to sympathize with the intellectuals—whose willing cooperation he needs if the economy is to be reformed—and he manages to keep his criticism of them to a minimum. It was Kosygin who gave signs of interest in the American proposal for a moratorium on offensive and defensive missiles, but the joint forces of the party bureaucracy and the military managed to hold up the talks for more than a year after he had first agreed to negotiations. All the while, Brezhnev was making speeches about the need to look to Russia's defenses.

The issues between the opposing factions in the Kremlin—cultural and economic, military and political—are much the same as they were in Czechoslovakia, allowing for the differences in size and power between these countries. Essentially, the debate pits conservatives against progressives. Although in many cases the issues between them appear to be strictly practical, the real struggle is between those who want to preserve the old system with as little change as possible and those who realize that it must be changed radically if it is to survive in a world that is constantly changing.

The events in Czechoslovakia will quicken the dispute. They will lead to greater strains and stresses in Russia and in the other Communist countries. The struggle will become more intense and, if a breakdown of the whole political system is to be averted, change—and rapid change—will have to be accepted.

The rebirth of freedom in Czechoslovakia was the result of the first real attempt by a member country of the Soviet bloc to speed up the changes that are inevitable in any case. The invasion of Czechoslovakia was one of the last spasms of a political organism still dominated by the conservatives. Even if it leads, for a time, to a strengthening of the forces of reaction in the Communist world, it will prove ultimately to have been their undoing.

ORDER OF BUSINESS

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

ADJOURNMENT UNTIL 11 A.M.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, if there be no further business to come before the Senate, I move, in accordance with the previous order, that the Senate stand in adjournment until 11 o'clock tomorrow morning.

The motion was agreed to; and (at 4 o'clock and 50 minutes p.m.) the Senate adjourned until tomorrow, Friday, October 11, 1968, at 11 a.m.

NOMINATIONS

Executive nominations received by the Senate October 10 (legislative day of October 9), 1968:

ARIZONA

Eva C. Morales, Kearney, Ariz., in place of C. L. Steveson, resigned.

Jerry P. Yazzie, Window Rock, Ariz., in place of H. L. McDonald, resigned.

CALIFORNIA

Irene H. Micheli, Ryde, Calif., in place of B. M. Calahan, deceased.

IDAHO

Betty Jane Nitz, Elk City, Idaho, in place of C. J. Nitz, resigned.

ILLINOIS

W. Russell Koch, Bowen, Ill., in place of L. O. Cain, retired.

INDIANA

Elsie E. Cornelius, Bath, Ind., in place of G. A. Rees, retired.

KANSAS

Lloyd K. Greenwood, McPherson, Kans., in place of R. F. Johnson, retired.

MICHIGAN

James H. Bolton, Galesburg, Mich., in place of W. M. Buss, retired.

David Rigozzi, Jr., Bangor, Mich., in place of P. B. Wood, retired.

Stanley L. Thompson, Hastings, Mich., in place of C. H. Hinman, retired.

MISSOURI

Frederick M. Ream, Green Ridge, Mo., in place of D. E. Myers, retired.

NEBRASKA

Robert T. Musil, DuBois, Nebr., in place of E. E. White, retired.

Court J. Fielding, Hayes Center, Nebr., in place of G. A. Kittle, retired.

NEW JERSEY

Anna L. Peterson, Leesburg, N.J., in place of I. B. Lowden, retired.

PENNSYLVANIA

Harry Marchesini, Millsboro, Pa., in place of C. W. Wishart, deceased.

TENNESSEE

Arthur E. McCaskill, Moscow, Tenn., in place of J. W. Simmons, retired.

TEXAS

Avis M. Tyler, Sundown, Tex., in place of D. E. Waggoner, deceased.

WASHINGTON

Paul E. DeHaven, Tonasket, Wash., in place of C. D. Williams, resigned.

WEST VIRGINIA

Joseph B. Faller, Ridgely, W. Va., in place of U. A. Dougherty, retired.

Doyle D. Robinson, Jr., Logan, W. Va., in place of M. L. Johnson, retired.

Melvin L. Atchley, New Hope, Ala., in place of G. B. Butler, retired.

Richard L. Reiter, Redlands, Calif., in place of D. J. Stanton, retired.

Loran L. Balch, Sagle, Idaho, in place of N. A. Sheffler, retired.

William L. Hampton, Ulysses, Kans., in place of J. S. Forrer, retired.

Ernest A. Paradis, Attleboro, Mass., in place of F. J. O'Neil, deceased.

James P. Fitzgerald, Monticello, Minn., in place of F. A. McCoy, retired.

Jesse L. Campbell, Manchester, Tenn., in place of W. C. St. John, deceased.

Robert A. Habermacher, Sabinal, Tex., in place of W. D. Stephens, retired.

Andrew J. Pachosa, Grand Coulee, Wash., in place of W. O. Kurth, retired.

James E. Broughton, Jr., Wellington, Ala., in place of M. C. Phillips, retired.

John M. Moore, Arkadelphia, Ark., in place of L. R. Nowlin, retired.

David M. Longmire, Jr., Brookdale, Calif., in place of E. J. Nelson, retired.

Llewellyn E. Burnham, Elsinore, Calif., in place of L. E. Burnham, retired.

Jacob C. Fewell, Okeechobee, Fla., in place of C. C. Betts, resigned.

Robert J. Yunker, Mokena, Ill., in place of M. M. O'Brien, retired.

Orrie G. Epple, Aredale, Iowa, in place of K. M. Hopkins, retired.

Robert E. Folkerts, Bristow, Iowa, in place of D. A. Early, deceased.

Robert A. Noll, Westmoreland, Kans., in place of C. S. Smith, retired.

Frank J. Rodman, Hermansville, Mich., in place of H. D. Stecker, retired.

Charles H. Pirch, Holden Mo., in place of J. L. Snyder, deceased.

Edward J. Welch, Guild, N.H., in place of G. L. Nichols, retired.

John A. Fulkrod, Ramsey, N.J., in place of J. D. Roosa, retired.

John J. Howley, South Amboy, N.J., in place of G. W. Stader, deceased.

Mary Alice Desmond, Athol Springs, N.Y., in place of H. T. Quick, retired.

Raymond P. Riordan, Auburn, N.Y., in place of T. H. Brogan, deceased.

Edgar A. Cashwell, Saxapahaw, N.C., in place of L. B. Woody, retired.

Ralph R. Peyton, Zanesville, Ohio, in place of H. W. McCracken, retired.

Raymond P. Hoffman, Fennimore, Wis., in place of Gerald Scanlan, retired.

John W. Bakker, Shell Lake, Wis., in place of H. N. Hoskins, transferred.

Paul R. Woods, Sumner, Iowa, in place of E. F. Borcherding, deceased.

Mildred L. Peterson, Toddville, Iowa, in place of Ivan Oliphant, retired.

Herbert E. Ryan, Jr., Rising Sun, Md., in place of F. M. Rawlings, deceased.

Charles F. Ward, Anoka, Minn., in place of W. J. Jacob, retired.

James D. Rassmussen, Grand Rapids, Minn., in place of H. M. Madson, retired.

Jerry D. Wood, Mount Vernon, Mo., in place of R. C. Fossett, retired.

Otis A. Tjeltveit, Red Lodge, Mont., in place of L. R. Spogen, retired.

Myron C. Haker, Stanford, Mont., in place of E. H. Burchak, retired.

Gordon H. Parnapy, North Bangor, N.Y., in place of E. V. Monica, deceased.

Karl C. Boeyink, Penfield, N.Y., in place of F. L. Jones, resigned.

DIPLOMATIC AND FOREIGN SERVICE

John B. Behm, of Maryland, to be a deputy special representative for Trade Negotiations, with the rank of Ambassador.

IN THE NATIONAL GUARD

The Army National Guard of the United States officer named herein for promotion as a Reserve commissioned officer of the Army, under provisions of title 10, United States Code, sections 593(a) and 3385:

To be major general

Brig. Gen. John C. Baker, O368365.

The Army National Guard of the United States officers named herein for appointment as Reserve commissioned officers of the Army, under provisions of title 10, United States Code, sections 593(a) and 3392:

To be major generals

Brig. Gen. Laurence B. Adams, Jr., O396901, Adjutant General's Corps.

Brig. Gen. Floyd L. Edsall, O555952, Adjutant General's Corps.

Brig. Gen. Charles H. Wilson, O485619, Adjutant General's Corps.

To be brigadier general

Col. Sylvester T. DelCorso, O358188, Adjutant General's Corps.

IN THE ARMY

The following-named person for appointment in the Regular Army, by transfer in the grade specified, under the provisions of title